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1 Introduction 
The RSA algorithm is certainly one of the most widespread public key algorithms [1]. In this paper we will 
use two characters consecrated into cryptography, Alice and Bob. In the known context of the RSA 
algorithm, we note with (𝑝𝐴, 𝑒𝐴) the pair of public and private key of Alice and with (𝑝𝐵, 𝑒𝐵) the public 
and private key owned by Bob. In order to send an encrypted message to Bob, Alice must retrieve Bob's 
public key, 𝑝𝐵. Although simple to do at first glance, this procedure is an interesting issue. If Bob tells Alice 
his public key over an unsafe channel then we will encounter another problem, namely, the problem of 
impersonation. Suppose Alice uses an unsafe channel in order to ask for Bob's public key. This channel is 
controlled by Eve, an attacker. Suppose that Eve holds pair of public and private key.denoted with (𝑝𝐸 , 𝑒𝐸). 
When Alice asks Bob's public key on this channel, Eve could change Bob's key, 𝑝𝐵, with his public key, 𝑝𝐸 . 
Alice will receive 𝑝𝐸  key instead of Bob's key, 𝑝𝐵. Now she will use 𝑝𝐸 in order to encrypt the message she 
wants to pass it on to Bob. Once the message has arrived to Eve, she can decrypt it with her own private 
key, 𝑒𝐸 . Eve can modify the message and encrypt it with Bob's public key. In this way, Bob will think that 
the message has come from Alice. This is briefly the impersonation problem. Since this is a core attack in 
a public key infrastructure, many applications are in danger of being attacked [2]. We therefore need a 
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mechanism to ensure that Alice's public key is indeed her and that Bob's public key is indeed his. This 
mechanism is named PKI. Although the subject is being treated for several decades, protocols underpinning 
pki are still published [3]. PKI mechanisms appear everywhere where public key cryptography is used. What 
provides such an infrastructure is a network of certificates issued by a central authority (CA). Each member 
enrolled in the public key infrastructure receives from the central authority, following verifications, a 
certificate linking the participant's identity to its public key. Thus, the issue of impersonation is solved using 
the PKI model. The main purpose of a public key infrastructure is to provide a secure communication 
channel between two participants. Most often, the communication channel is a hybrid channel. In the first 
phase, through the public key encryption mechanisms provided by the infrastructure, a symmetric key is 
distributed between participants. From this moment, the participants will use a symmetric algorithm in 
order to communicate. The vast majority of public key infrastructures use the as an asymmetric algorithm, 
the RSA algorithm. This leads to the next problem of these infrastructures, a problem whose solution we 
have tried to elaborate in this paper. The RSA algorithm has as a cryptographic primitive the factorization 
problem [4]. In other words, given a RSA module, 𝑁 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞, a classical polynomial algorithm for factoring 
is not known. Although a classical algorithm is not yet known. This is the famous N vs NP problem [5] for 
the factorization problem, this can not be said about the quantum algorithms. In 1994, Ptere Shor proposes 
an efficient quantum algorithm to solve the problem of factorization [6]. In the last past years, physical 
implementations was proposed for Shor algorithm [7]. Although this algorithm did not represent a good 
period of time a threat to the RSA algorithm and implicitly to public key infrastructures, this is no longer 
true at the moment. Quantum computers are no longer simple lab experiments. Such a quantum computer 
is provided through a cloud by IBM Q [8]. In December 2017, Microsoft announced a new quantum 
programming language integrated in Visual Studio, Q # [9]. At the time of writing this paper, Microsoft 
simulator has a number of 30 quits. IBM Q provides not only a 32 qubit simulator but also cloud access to 
a real device with up to 16 qubits [8]. All this advance towards a scalable quantum computer [9] raises 
concerns about public key infrastructures, specifically with regard to the RSA algorithm. In this paper, we 
propose a quantum cryptographic scheme that could replace the RSA algorithm in PKI infrastructures. The 
cryptographic scheme we propose aims to achieve the goal of encrypting a qubit. By definition, encryption 
of a qubit is a cryptographic operation that does not allow an attacker to access the probability amplitudes 
that define the superposition of the qubit. n other words, given that an attacker could statistically determine 
the probability amplitudes of the qubit superposition state, the encryption operation assures that the 
attacker can not reconstruct through quantum tomography the probability amplitudes [10][11]. Using an 
encrypted qubit we can transmit both a bit of classical information, in which case one of the two probability 
amplitudes would be 0 and more information bits by means of probability amplitudes. In other words, the 
information encrypted with this scheme can be encoded in the form of probability amplitudes. Thus, from 
a single run of the scheme we can transmit several bits of information.  But we can use the scheme to send 
one bit of information each time we run. In this latter case, the complexity of the scheme may be an 
impediment. The scheme falls under the category of asymmetric cryptographic schemes as the encryption 
key differes the decryption key. The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we discuss an overview of 
quantum cryptography with a demonstration experiment for generating a random number represented on 
4 bits. In Section 3 we discuss the proposed cryptographic scheme as well as an implementation using the 
qiskit api. In Section 4 we discuss the conclusions and future directions of research. 
2 An Overview of Quantum Cryptography 
The most known application of quantum effects in cryptography is the key distribution [12], [13]. The first 
and best known work that uses quantum effects to achieve a cryptographic objective is the work of Charles 
Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984 [14]. The paper proposes the use of quantum properties for key 
distribution between two parts, Alice and Bob. The protocol is called BB84 and uses two effects of quantum 
systems. The first effect is known as non-cloning theorem. What this theorem says is the fact that a quantum 
system cannot be copied without being previously measured [15]. This prompts the emergence of 
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cryptographic applications. A second basic effect used by the BB84 protocol is the collapse of probability 
wave. In other words, given a quantum system represented by a qubit in the superposition state (1), after 
measurement, the system will collapse into one of the two basic states, |0⟩ or |1⟩, each state having a 
probability of 50% being measured. 
|𝜓⟩ =
1
√2
|0⟩ +
1
√2
|1⟩ 
(1) 
The protocol also has a statistical mechanism for detecting an attacker. The BB84 protocol is a theoretical 
model and an example of using quantum effects in setting cryptographic tasks but is not used in practice. 
Although the theoretical protocol has perfect security based on the effects of quantum physics instead of 
some primitive mathematics, a series of attacks against that have been found over time [16]. These attacks 
are also of a physical nature. An important lesson learned from the story of this protocol is that prudence 
is a key factor in cryptography. Although we can ensure perfect security by using quantum effects, some 
physical effects can endanger the security of the scheme. Another protocol for key distribution is the E91 
protocol [17]. Developed in 1991 by Artur Ekert, the protocol uses the effects of the entanglement state to 
perform a cryptographic function. The effect of entanglement can be described most intuitively at the level 
of a system of qubits as described in (2).  
|𝜓⟩ =
1
√2
|00⟩ +
1
√2
|11⟩ 
(2) 
Analyzing the state (2) we notice that for any qubit that we measure we have a 50% chance for |0⟩ and 50% 
chance for |1⟩. The interesting part is what happens to the other qubit, which is not measured. According 
to state (2), if the first qubit was measured and found in the state |0⟩  for example, then we can safely say 
that the other qubit is also in this state. This effect has been greatly disputed in physics [18]. The effects of 
the entanglement state also lead to various applications in cryptography. A well-known circuit based on 
entanglement is the teleporting circuit which has also found applications in various cryptographic functions 
[19]. 
Another place where quantum physics finds its application in cryptography is in the field of random number 
generation. Random generation has extensive cryptography ramifications. The state described in (1) is a 
perfect generator of random numbers. Although we can only generate one bit using the qubit in state (1), 
a 𝑛 qubit system in which each qubit is found in the state (1) will generate n random bits. The state (1) can 
easily be prepared by applying to a qubit originally found in the state |0⟩ a Hadamard gate [20]. Here's an 
example of how to generate a random number that can be represented on 4 bits. Running the circuit in 
Figure 1 1024 times we could reconstruct the histogram of the results in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 1: Circuit used to generate a random number represented by 4 bits 
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Figure 2: Histogram of the results obtained following the execution of the circuit in Figure 1 1024 times. 
As we can see from the histogram, each number has a probability of about 6.25% to be measured.  
3 The Proposed Scheme 
We present in this section the proposed cryptographic scheme, and in the 3.2 section we present the security 
analysis in the case of a brute-force attack and in the 3.3 section we present the schematic deployment 
implementation using the qiskit api. 
3.1 Construction of the Cryptographic Scheme 
The scheme that we are proposing aims at delivering a secure transmission of a qubit from Alice to Bob. 
In other words, we do not want a possible Eve attacker to take possession of the qubit. Consider the qubit 
in state (3) as the qubit we want to transmit. 
|𝜓⟩ = 𝑎|0⟩ + 𝑏|1⟩ (3) 
Where 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈  ℂ and |𝑎|2 + |𝑏|2 = 1.  
By encrypting the qubit in state (3) we understand an operation whereby an attacker cannot determine the 
probability amplitudes 𝑎 and 𝑏 irrespective of the number of measurements performed. In the proposed 
scheme we use a set of 𝑛 +  1 unitary transformations, 𝑀 = {𝑈0, 𝑈1, … 𝑈𝑛}. Each of the transformations 
in the 𝑀 set respects the general form of a quantum gate for a system consisting of a single qubit, namely 
the form (4). 
𝑈𝑖 = (
𝑎 𝑏
−𝑒𝑖𝜑𝑏∗ 𝑒𝑖𝜑𝑎∗
) , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 (4) 
Where 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈  ℂ and 𝜑 ∈ ℝ, |𝑎|2 + |𝑏|2 = 1.  
Suppose for the security analysis of the scheme, that the numbers 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝜑 can be represented using 𝑡 bits.  
The scheme we are proposing consists of two stages. In the first phase we propose a key generation 
mechanism and in the second phase we show the qubit encryption scheme. Key generation takes place as 
follows: 
1. Alice generates random numbers 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝜑 represented on 𝑡 bits, then builds the 
matrix  𝑈0 = (
𝑎 𝑏
−𝑒𝑖𝜑𝑏∗ 𝑒𝑖𝜑𝑎∗
). 
2. Alice generates 𝑛 random numbers each represented on 𝑡 bits. We note these numbers with 
𝑝1, 𝑝2 … , 𝑝𝑛. 
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3. Alice calculates the transformations 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈0
𝑝𝑖 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
4. Alice's public key, denoted with 𝑝𝐴, will be the set of transformations {𝑈1, 𝑈2, … , 𝑈𝑛} and 
her private key,denoted with 𝑒𝐴, will be the transformation 𝑈0. 
We have chosen to define the set 𝑀 of transformations as exponents of the transformation 𝑈0 to ensure 
that any two transformations in the set 𝑀 commutes between them. Once the key generation procedure is 
defined, we can also define the qubit encryption procedure. Suppose Bob wants to encrypt a qubit in the 
state (3) for Alice. Encryption is done as follows: 
1. Bob generates randomly a set of 𝑟 natural numbers ranging from 1 to 𝑛. We note this set 
with 𝑅 = {𝑟1, 𝑟2, … 𝑟𝑟}, 1 ≤ 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
2. We denote with 𝑈𝑅 the composition of the transformations 𝑈𝑟1 , 𝑈𝑟2 , … 𝑈𝑟𝑟 . In other words, 
𝑈𝑅 = ∏ 𝑈𝑟𝑖
𝑟
𝑖=1 . Bob applies the transformation 𝑈𝑅to the a qubit in state (3). The qubit new 
state is now |𝜓1⟩ = 𝑈𝑅|𝜓⟩. Bob sends Alice through an unsafe channel the qubit in the state 
|𝜓1⟩. 
 
For decryption, Alice will proceed as follows: 
1. We note with 𝑈𝑇 the composition of the transformations from the set 𝑀. In other words, 
𝑈𝑇 = ∏ 𝑈𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 . Alice applies to a qubit in the state |𝜓
1⟩ the transformation 𝑈𝑇 . The qubit 
state is now |𝜓2⟩ =𝑈𝑇|𝜓
1⟩ . Alice sends Bob the qubit in the state |𝜓2⟩. 
2. Bob calculates on the basis of set 𝑅, the inverse to 𝑈𝑅. We denote with 𝑈
† the conjugate 
transpose of 𝑈. Thus 𝑈𝑅
† = ∏ 𝑈𝑟𝑖
†𝑟
𝑖=1 . Bob applies to the qubit in the state |𝜓
2⟩ the 
transformation 𝑈𝑅
†, hence the new state of the qubit is |𝜓3⟩ = 𝑈𝑅
†|𝜓2⟩ = 𝑈𝑅
†𝑈𝑇|𝜓
1⟩ =
𝑈𝑅
†𝑈𝑇𝑈𝑅|𝜓⟩ = 𝑈𝑅
†𝑈𝑅𝑈𝑇|𝜓⟩ = 𝐼𝑈𝑇|𝜓⟩ = 𝑈𝑇|𝜓⟩. Bob sends Alice the qubit in the 
state |𝜓3⟩. 
3. Alice applies to the qubit that she received from Bob, in the state |𝜓3⟩ the transorm 𝑈𝑇
† , 
hence the new state of the qubit is 𝑈𝑇
†|𝜓3⟩ = 𝑈𝑇
†𝑈𝑇|𝜓⟩ = 𝐼|𝜓⟩ = |𝜓⟩. So Alice recovers 
the original qubit from Bob. 
 
3.2 Security Analysis 
In this section we analyze the complexity of a brute force attack. By definition, we consider that the protocol 
has been broken when an attacker manages to statistically obtain a qubit in state (3). For reference, we 
compare the complexity of the attack on the proposed scheme with the complexity of a brute force attack 
on AES 256, considered to be a safe algorithm [21]. That is, we will compare the complexity of the attack 
on our scheme with 2256. The probability that an 
attacker guesses an AES 256 key is 
𝑢
2256
, where u is 
the number of attempts he makes. For simplicity 
we will considered 𝑢 = 1.  
We begin the analysis by discussing the probability 
that an attacker can guess exactly the set of 𝑅 
transformations used by Bob. Since every two 
transformations in the 𝑀 set commutes, the 
probability that an attacker guesses from a single 
test, the set R is 
1
𝐶𝑛
𝑟. For comparison we choose 𝑛 =
512 and 𝑟 =  𝑓𝑛. Where 0 < 𝑓 < 1. In Figure 3, 
the fraction 𝑓 is passed along the horizontal axis 
and the difference (𝐶𝑛
𝑟 − 2256) is passed on the 
vertical axis.      Figure 3: The difference  (𝐶𝑛
𝑟 − 2256) 
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It is noted that for 𝑓 ≅ 0.5 (𝐶𝑛
𝑟 − 2256) ≫ 0, which means that the probability that an attacker guesses 
the 𝑅 set is much smaller than the probability that an attacker to guess an AES 256 key. 
A second aspect we examine is the likelihood that an attacker will impersonate Alice. In other words, we 
examine the probability of an attacker guessing the transformation 𝑈𝑇 . Given the general form of a unitary 
transformation (4), the transformation 𝑈𝑇 is uniquely determined by the three numbers, 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝜑. As 
specified in the description of the scheme, each of the three numbers can be represented on 𝑡 bits. 
Therefore the probability that an attacker guesses the tranformation 𝑈𝑇 is 
1
23𝑡
 . Therefore for 𝑡 > 86, 3𝑡 >
256 which implies 
1
23𝑡
<
1
2256
.  
Concluding, we can say that using a number of 𝑛 ≥ 512 unit transformations of which Bob will choose 
about 50% to make the 𝑅 set and using numbers represented by more than 86 bits to define unitary 
transformations, the proposed scheme is safe for with regard to brute force attacks. 
3.3 An Implementation of the Scheme in Qiskit 
First, the proposed scheme involves generating random numbers. The implementation of a circuit capable 
of generating a random number has already been described in Section 2. Another equivalent form of 
expression of a unitary transformation is (5). 
𝑈 = (
𝑐𝑜𝑠 (
𝜃
2
) −𝑒𝑖𝜆𝑠𝑖𝑛 (
𝜃
2
)
𝑒𝑖𝜑𝑠𝑖𝑛 (
𝜃
2
) 𝑒𝑖𝜑+𝑖𝜆𝑠𝑖𝑛 (
𝜃
2
)
) 
(5) 
Any unitary transformation can be implemented in qiskit with the u3 (theta, phi, lam, q) function that 
conforms to the notations given in form (5). Alice's public key will consist of the actual values that 
determine each transformation in part, but to implement the transformations in qiskit, they will be 
determined by those three values: 𝜃, 𝜑 and 𝜆. In other words, Bob does not have access to these values in 
the actual version of the scheme, but for these simulations, these values will be used. For simulation, we 
consider 𝜃 =
𝜋
3
, 𝜑 = 𝜆 =
𝜋
√2
 , 𝑝1 = 3, 𝑝2 = 5, 𝑝3 = 7, 𝑝4 = 11, 𝑅 = {2,4}. To implement the 
transformations 𝑈0, we implemented a function that applies the transformation a number of times equal 
to the power at which the transformation 𝑈0 is intended to be exponential. Figure 4 describes the 
exponential function. 
 
Figure 4:  The exponential of 𝑈0 
The simulation of the scheme is structured in 4 steps. The first step is made by Bob encrypting the qubit 
|𝜓⟩ by applying the 𝑈2and 𝑈4 transformations. This step is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: The application of the gates 𝑈2 and 𝑈4 
The second step is made by Alice and consists in the application of the gates 𝑈𝑖 , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 4, as illustrated 
in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: The application the entire set of gates to the qubit by Alice 
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The third and fourth steps are Bob's application of inverse transformations to those applied at the first step 
and Alice's application of inverse transformations to those applied in step 2. 
 
Figure 7: Applying inverse transformations by Bob, respectively Alice 
The qubit we will encrypt is the one described in (6). 
|𝜓⟩ =
1
√2
|0⟩ +
1
√2
|1⟩ 
(6) 
To obtain condition (6), apply to a qubit 
initially in the state |0⟩ the Hadamard 
gate [19]. To run the experiment, the 
functions described in Figures 5, 6 and 7 
are run sequentially. Theoretically, Alice 
should recover the qubit (6). This is 
checked by quantum tomography [10]. In 
other words, we run the experiment 
circuit 1024 times and statistically 
reconstruct the probability amplitudes. 
The histogram of the obtained results is 
shown in Figure 8.    Figure 8: Histogram of the results obtained by Alice 
At the same time, another point to the 
experiment is to convince us that an 
attacker can not rebuild these probability 
amplitudes. For this we measure 
statistically the state of the qubit by 
quantum tomography whenever it is 
transmitted between Alice and Bob [10]. 
In particular, we rebuild the state 
immediately after Bob's first step, after 
Alice's first step and Bob's second step. 
The results are reported in the Figures 5, 
6 and 7.     
 
The histogram of the results of the qubit after the first step of Bob are described in Figure 9, the results of 
the measurement after the first step of Alice are described in Figure 10 and the results after the second step 
of Bob are described in Figure 11. 
As can be seen from Figures 9, 10 and 11, the statistical reconstruction of the qubit state in one of the 
intermediate steps leads to differing probability amplitudes from the real probabilities. We can therefore 
conclude that the scheme achieves its experimental objective of encrypting the qubit. 
 
Figure 9: The histogram of the results immediately 
after Bob's first step 
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Figure 10: Histogram of results immediately after Alice's first step 
 
Figure 11: Histogram of the results after Bob's second step 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper we proposed a public key cryptographic scheme to replace the RSA algorithm in PKI 
infrastructures. The rapidity with which quantum machines evolve will jeopardize current PKI 
infrastructures that still use RSA. The proposed scheme provides encryption of a qubit. Thus, we can use 
the scheme either for passing a classical bit of information in turn, or we can encode the information we 
want to encrypt in the form of probability amplitudes of the qubit superposition state. We studied the 
complexity of a brute force attack and concluded that this is equivalent in the computational power required 
with that of an attack on AES-256, an algorithm considered safe even in the context of quantum computing. 
We also presented a demonstration tutorial on how to implement the proposed scheme. We have seen 
experimentally that Alice recovers through quantum tomography the probability amplitudes transmitted by 
Bob. We also experimentally saw that any attempt to determine the probability amplitudes in one of the 
intermediate phases when the qubit is transmitted between Alice and Bob leads to the determination of 
amplitudes that do not match the real ones. Like future research directions, we could add a way to determine 
the attacker's presence. Although we have seen that the attacker cannot reconstruct the correct probability 
amplitudes, we did not say anything about a way of deciding it. Another direction of research would be 
switching from classical to quantum algorithms in other areas of PKI. In this paper we only addressed the 
issue of confidentiality. Future papers can address the issues of authenticity, non-repudiation, or integrity 
of messages in a PKI infrastructure. 
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